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Abstrak 
Proteksi sistem untuk daerah yang luas (WAP) dipelajari untuk meningkatkan kinerja proteksi 
cadangan yang konvensional. Dalam tulisan ini, arsitektur sistem WAP diusulkan beserta kunci 
teknologinya dibahas dalam sudut pandang rekayasa. Suatu struktur campuran, struktur terpusat -
terdistribusi yang lebih cocok untuk WAP jala-jala listrik terbatas, dapat diperoleh berdasarkan keuntungan 
dari struktur terpusat dan struktur terdistribusi. Selanjutnya, algoritma proteksi berdasarkan jarak diambil 
sebagai contoh untuk menggambarkan fungsi dari unit-unit penyusunnya . Komponen yang terganggu 
dapat dideteksi berdasarkan algoritma multi-sumber informasi sekering. Algoritma yang diusulkan tidak 
hanya dapat meningkatkan selektivitas, kecepatan dan keandalan proteksi tetapi juga memiliki 
kemampuan menoleransi kesalahan yang tinggi. Sebuah hasil simulasi jala-jala 220 kV di provinsi Hubei 
Paskah menunjukkan efektivitas dari sistem proteksi untuk daerah yang luas yang disajikan dalam tulisan 
ini. 
 
Kata kunci: proteksi daerah yang luas (WAP), identifikasi gangguan, struktur-terpusat-terdistribusi, 
proteksi daerah berdasar jarak. 
 
 
Abstract 
Wide-area protection system (WAPS) is widely studied for the purpose of improving the 
performance of conventional backup protection. In this paper, the system architecture of WAPS is 
proposed and its key technologies are discussed in view of engineering projects. So a mixed structure-
centralized-distributed structure which is more suitable for WAPS in limited power grid region, is obtained 
based on the advantages of the centralized structure and distributed structure. Furthermore, regional 
distance protection algorithm was taken as an example to illustrate the functions of the constituent units. 
Faulted components can be detected based on multi-source imformation fuse in the algorithm. And the 
algorithm cannot only improved the selectivity, the rapidity, and the reliability of relaying protection but also 
has high fault tolerant capability. A simulation of 220 kV grid systems in Easter Hubei province showed the 
effectiveness of the wide-area protection system presented by this paper. 
 
Keywords: Wide-area protection, fault identification, centralized-distributed structure, regional distance 
protection 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Protective relaying is an important line of defense in power grid. Its reliability and 
rapidity are essential to fault isolation and prevention of accident expansion. According to 
statistics, nearly 75% of power system disturbances are caused by the mal-operation of backup 
protection [1]. The conventional backup protection, which relies on in situ information, has some 
problems in setting coordination. These problems have become more acute under current 
circumstance of widely interconnected grid and bulk power transmission over long distances 
[2],[3]. The cascading trip accidents incurred by mal-operation of backup protection under heavy 
loading condition, as well as the hidden failures caused by setting coordination errors, will 
increase the risk of instability of power grid [4],[5]. 
In recent years, with the development of wide-area measurement system (WAMS), 
WAPS based on multi-information fusion has emerged as a promising tool in addressing the 
mentioned problems above [6],[7]. According to the description of CIGRE, researches on WAPS 
can be divided into two aspects: one focuses on the study of the security and stability control of 
power grid based on wide-area information, which is mainly focus on monitoring, analyzing and 
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evaluating the stable operating state of power grid [8]; the other focuses on improving the 
performance of conventional relaying protection with the use of wide-area information. It should 
be noted that the existing primary protection of high-voltage grid is mainly pilot protection, which 
boasts the advantages of rapidity, independence of load transfer, easy setting and high rate of 
accuracy. In contrast, WAPS has limitations in terms of the synchronicity of information 
sampling, the timeliness, reliability and security of information transmission. Therefore, when 
mentioned that wide-area information to improve the performance of relaying protection, it is 
usually referred to backup protection. 
Researchers at home and abroad have made preliminary studies into the architecture of 
WAPS and the principle of faulted components detection. Wide-area protection can be divided 
into three types according to the architecture they took, which are centralized structure, 
distributed structure and mixed structure. In the centralized structure, the core decision system 
is concentrated at a central point. This structure can acquire maximum information with little 
communication traffic, which is conducive to integrate between relaying decision system and 
stability control system. Yet, centralized decision center is vulnerable to interference and 
increase the risk of single point failure [9]. In the distributed structure, the core decision system 
is located in Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) which distributed over the wide-area grid, and 
the entire protection function is fulfilled by the cooperation of these IEDs. This structure boasts 
strong adaptive capacity and there is no risk of single point failure, but the involved heavy 
communication traffic, the limited information available to decision units, and the complex 
system design are its shortcomings [10]. The mixed structure integrates the advantages of 
centralized structure and distributes structure while makes up for their shortcomings, but there 
lacks a detailed scheme to implement this structure and insufficient cooperation between the 
distributed IED and centralized core unit will lead to single point failure risk [11]. Hence, in order 
to meet the actual needs in wide-area relaying protection engineering, studying the architecture 
of wide-area protection system is great significance. 
Considering the application characteristics of WAPS and starting from the introduction 
of the responsibility and requirements of relaying protection, this paper first proposes a 
centralized-distributed structure for WAPS and then discusses a faulted component 
identification algorithm which called regional distance protection based on multi-information. 
 
 
2.  Centralized-Distributed System Architecture 
2.1. Limited Wide Area Protection 
The core idea of wide-area protection is to detect faulty components by fusing multi-
information sampled synchronously over wide area grid and to isolate these faulty components 
reliably and quickly by simple logic coordination. Multi-information fusion does not literally mean 
the fusion of information of the entire grid, neither does it imply that the more information, the 
better. Therefore, to construct a WAPS covering all the substations and to promote information 
exchange in the entire grid is unnecessary. Making full use of information in the limited area grid 
to improve relaying performance is not only a reasonable developing trend for WAPS, but also 
further current research of the principle of WAPS and meets the requirement in real 
engineering. The concept of limited wide-area protection is manifested in the following aspects: 
1. Limited responsibility. The major responsibility of WAPS is still to isolate faulty 
components. 
2. Limited information. Wide-area decision center only requires highly sensitive information 
from near faulty point to make fault decision. If the protection system brings together the 
fault information from all the substations, useful information will be lost in a sea of 
redundant data, thus increasing the information retrieval difficulty. 
3. The implementation of WAPS is a gradual process. Dividing the whole grid into different 
regions and implementing the relaying protection function region by region is a reasonable 
developing trend for the power grid in the long term and it is conducive to system 
engineering. 
So, partitioning power grid into multi limited regions is the foundation of WAPS [12]. At 
the same time protection region is bound to affect the architecture of WAPS. 
 
2.1. System Architecture 
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The conventional distributed architecture and centralized architecture have their own 
advantages and disadvantages. In this paper, a novel mixed architecture, centralized-distributed 
architecture, is proposed based on the advantages of two conventional architectures. The 
centralized-distributed nature is manifested in several ways: in the substation, a great variety of 
information is first collected form and controlled by the IEDs located at intervals in the substation 
in a distributed manner before it is centralized and treated in the substation processing unit. 
When it comes to the regional centralized decision-making, the processing unit of each 
substation applies the distributed mode while the decision center applies the centralized mode. 
In this way, this mixed system architecture not only combines the advantages of two 
conventional architectures, but also meets special characteristics of limited wide area 
protection, thus providing foundation for the safe and stable computation of region grid in the 
future. Figure 1 is an illustration of the proposed structure. 
In Figure 1, the substation S is the decision center, and noted as master station. 
Besides completing information collection, protection and control of the substation, the master 
station is responsible for centralized decision-making with multi-information from regional grid. 
Transforming stations other than the master station are called the sub-stations of the system. 
Functions fulfilled by each unit in system are as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. System architecture of wide area 
protection 
 
Figure 2. Characters of distance 
protection 
 
1) Local measurement and control unit (hereinafter referred to LMCU). LMCU is mainly 
responsible for collecting in situ measurement information about current transformer and 
voltage transformer and status information about circuit breaker; executing breaker 
operation; performing conventional main protection function; judging the startup of backup 
protection components; as well as completing communication function with substation 
decision unit (hereinafter referred to as SDU). Besides, in the case that LMCU loses 
contact with SDU, it can accomplish the conventional backup protection for SDU. 
2) Substation decision unit (SDU). SDU is mainly responsible for integrating information from 
LMCU and making corresponding decision, and for communicating with regional decision 
unit (hereinafter referred to as RDU) and LMCU. As a gathering point for all the information 
and communication of the whole substation, SDU is a key unit in the substation. Therefore, 
in order to avoid single equipment failure and to achieve the effective protection, SDU in 
each substation adopts dual configuration: SDU1 is the master device while SDU2 is the 
hot backup. Both of them simultaneously receive information from LMCU and RDU and 
conduct computation and processing. SDU1 sends information to RDU or the 
corresponding LMCU, and to SDU2. Under normal conditions, SDU2 serves as monitoring 
and supervision equipment for SDU1, which will not send information to RDU with the view 
to reducing wide-area communication traffic. In the case that SDU1 breaks down, SDU2 
will be automatically switched into the master device. Moreover, when both SDU1 and 
SDU2 lose communication with RDU, communication with the SDU of adjacent substation 
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will be started automatically. The adjacent substation will complete fault detection of buses 
and connect lines, serving as the backup protection of RDU. 
3) Regional Decision Unit (RDU). RDU is mainly responsible for gathering information from 
substations in the region, identifying faulty component based on multi-information, and 
making protection action strategy as well as communicating with SDU. RDU is the core of 
WAPS and the key to faulty component detection with multi-information. In order to avoid 
the risk of single point failure, RDU in master station adopts dual configuration: RDU1 is 
the master device while RDU2 is the hot back-up device, both of them receive information 
from SPPU and conduct processing. RDU1 sends decision information to RDU2. Under 
normal conditions, RDU2 serves as the monitoring and supervision equipment for RDU1. In 
the case that RDU1 breaks down, RDU2 is automatically switched into the master device. 
4) Other functions. The system also fulfills other functions, such as clock synchronization 
function based on the entire power grid, information exchange with protection systems of 
other regions and so on.  
The main purpose of utilizing multi-information to fulfill wide-area relay protection is to 
improve the backup protection performance and solve some problems existing in conventional 
backup protection based on situ information. The coordination among various processing units 
can improve the main protection performance. At the same time, if properly handled, the backup 
protection can be used as the main protection. Because of the protection partition and the multi-
layer protection structure, the scope of protection and control is large. The local decision center 
should be able to develop and implement more reliable, selective backup protection action 
strategy so as to improve the ability deal with complex field wiring. 
 
 
3.  Regional Distance Protection 
Depending on different system architecture, the implementation of the same fault 
detection algorithm varies greatly. Referring to the algorithm for main protection of power 
system, the current study in fault detection algorithm focuses on extending principles of 
directional comparison pilot protection [13] and current differential protection [14] to the wide-
area protection and utilizing expert system to enhance tolerance capability. However, both of 
the protections have some shortcomings. For current differential protection, it is susceptible to 
the influence of capacitive current and accumulated wide-area measurement error; while for the 
directional comparison pilot protection, it is liable to cause flow transfer mal-operation, and other 
complex problems such as setting and time delay. 
Based on wide-area communication system, RDU can integrate multi-information in 
protected regions. How to utilize the information in faulty components detection has been 
always a research hotspot. Based on the architecture of WAPS, the paper discussed the 
operating characteristics of protected elements and faulty component detection algorithm, and 
finally proposed the principle of regional distance protection. 
 
3.1. Characteristics of Protection Start-up Components 
Conventional backup protection is a mainly three-zone distance protection, achieved by 
setting and delay coordination, which not only increases the difficulty of setting but also 
hampers fast faulty component isolation, bringing damages to the equipment and further 
affecting security and stability of the power grid. Particularly in large-scale flow transfer, the mal-
operation of zone 3 protection may lead to cascade tripping, and even large blackouts. 
To enhance the reliability, rapidity and selectivity of WAPS, the start-up components on 
zone 2, zone 3 and zone 4 protection installed on LMCU (here means action information of 
protection components without time delay) can be utilized. Then through simple logical 
computation on multi-information, RDU or SDU will complete relay protection accurately and 
rapidly. Meanwhile, to avoid mal-operation of the conventional zone 3 protection during large-
scale flow transfer and to improve the reliability of the protection system, this paper improves 
the zone 3 protection. The operating characteristics of distance protection components are 
shown in Figure 2. Zone 2 and zone 4 is the same with conventional distance protection. The 
scope of protection zone 2 and zone 4 are in Figure 2 (a). 
 When non-grounding fault occurs, there exists no zero-sequence current in the system. 
In order to prevent mal-operation of zone 3 protection during large-scale flow transfer, within the 
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protection scope of zone 3 protection, a new relay is adopted, as shown in Figure 2 (b). The 
operation equation is shown in Equation 1 
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Figure 3. Protection information zone of wide 
area protection 
Figure 4. 220kV eastern Hubei province power 
grid 
 
   
When a ground fault occurs, the monitoring function of zero-sequence current is put into 
use. When setII ≥0 , the operation characteristic of the zone 3 ground distance is automatically 
changed into an ohm relay so as to improve anti-grounding resistance of the distance 
protection. The operation equation is shown in Equation 2, where setI  is the monitoring setting 
of zero-sequence current, which is adjusted by the principle that the sensibility must be ensured 
when earth faults through high impedance (100 ~ 300 ohm) occurs in the end of the protected 
lines. 
 
3.2. Principle of Fault Decision-making 
Take the transmission system shown in Figure1 as an example, zone 2, zone 3 and 
zone 4 protections are installed at both sides of the line. According to different information 
adopted, the decision center can divide protected objects into different PIZ (Protection 
Information Zone). Take L2 in Figure 1 as an example, the information zone constitutes three 
parts: the zone enclosed by the protected object is the minimal zone PIZ1. The information from 
substations at both sides of the line constitute intermediate information zone PIZ2. The remote 
back-up protection information of one line constitutes the maximum information zone PIZ3. The 
information protection zones and their protection scope are shown in Figure 3.  
When fault occurs to the line, the decision center will follow the following principle to 
identify fault component: 
1) PIZ1 information constitutes protection criterion 1, and the principle is the same with the 
conventional pilot distance protection. The zone 2 or zone 3 protections at both ends of the line 
will start up simultaneously to identify the internal failure, as shown in Equation 3: 
 
TELKOMNIKA  ISSN: 1693-6930  
 
Architecture and Fault Identification of Wide-area Protection System (Zhenxing Li) 
447 
∑
=
∩=
3
2
541_2 )(
i
L ZiZiAV          (3)   
Where 1_2LAV (Action Value) is the operating value of criteria 1 for the line L2; 42Z  is the 
startup value of zone 2 protection of LMCU4. Other components are named in the same rule. 
 
2 ） PIZ2 information constitutes protection criterion 2. According to common operation 
characteristics of protection in the overlapped zone, the startup information at zone 2 protection 
of the line, along with the non-startup information of zone 4 protections at the opposite side of 
the line and zone 2 protection of the next line identifies the fault of line L2. Or, the startup 
information at zone 3 protection of the line, the non-startup information of zone 4 protection of 
the opposite side of the line and the zone 3 protection of the next line combine to identify the 
internal fault which occurs to L2. The whole process is shown in Equation 4: 
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3 ） PIZ3 information constitutes protection criterion 3. According to common operation 
characteristics of protection in the overlapped region, the startup information of zone 3 
protection of the line, and the non-operation information of zone 4 protections of the other lines 
on the same bus and zone 2 protection of the next line combine identify the internal fault which 
occurs to the line. The whole process is shown in Equation 5: 
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The main purpose of utilizing multi-information to fulfill WAPS is to improve the back-up 
protection performance and solve some problems existing in conventional back-up protection 
based on in situ information. Instead of relying on delayed coordination, the regional distance 
protection proposed in this paper has definite selectivity and satisfactory rapidity. Of course, the 
coordination among various processing units can improve the main protection performance. At 
the same time, if properly handled, the back-up protection can be used as the back-up primary 
protection. 
 
 
4.  Regional Distance Protection 
4.1. Communication System 
Communication system is the foundation of WAPS. It restricts the scope of protection 
and control. With the development of Wide Area Measurement System (WAMS) and optical 
fiber communication technology, as well as the gradual popularization of the digital substation 
based on IEC61850, GOOSE transfer mode grouping all the information in a substation into a 
data set has become the developing trend of information transmission in wide-area protection 
[15].  At the same time, the rapid development of SDH fiber ring network has laid a solid 
foundation for the formation of communication network of wide-area protection. For lines where 
no fiber channel is laid, pilot protection channel is regarded as a sound choice for the 
construction of wide-area communication network. 
 
4.2. The Principle of Faulty Component Detection 
Affected by the delay in communication and system instability, the proposed WAPS 
cannot completely replace conventional main protection. The measurement, judgment, 
communication and control of the conventional main protection is realized in each LMCU; while 
RDU mainly fulfills the backup protection based on multi-information fusion. One thing worth 
should be noticed is that one protection criterion is not enough to fully determine the faulty 
components. As WAPS is influenced by many factors, such as time synchronization, system 
communications, fault information and system operating mode, etc, different protection 
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algorithms are subject to different restrictions. Therefore, RDU uses a variety of protection 
criteria in compliance with different principles to guarantee the reliable fault detection effectively. 
 
 
4.3. Cooperation of Multi-layer Process Units 
Although RDU and SDU adopt dual configuration, the decision error may happen at 
times due to the large scope of wide-area protection. Once the failure or decision error occurs, 
there will be huge damages to power grid. In order to address this problem, we shall take the 
following measures: 
1) Besides adopting dual configuration, RDU and SDU must establish a master-slave 
mechanism in which master device conducts information processing and decision making 
while the slave device conducts monitoring and supervision function, and sends the 
supervision results back to the master device in time. If the master equipment gives a 
reply, the master equipment will conduct fault tolerance treatment. If the reply is not given, 
the slave equipment will be automatically switched into the master equipment. 
2) When SDU losses contact with RDU, SDU will set up communication with the SDU in the 
adjacent substation, and cooperate with it to achieve the back-up protection for the 
substation and lines. 
3) In the event that communication between SDU and main network is cut off, SDU will 
directly use information of the substation to provide back-up protection. 
4) When error occurs to SDU, each LMCU of the substation will fulfill regular back-up 
protection and guarantee the current state of conventional relay configuration. 
 
4.4. Fault-tolerant Design 
Information loss or error is likely to happen during the process of measuring, judging, 
communicating and transmitting wide-area information. Considering this fact, the faulty 
component detection of WAPS based on incomplete or erroneous information has the risk of 
mal-operation.  Therefore, the design of protection criterion based on fault tolerance has 
become one of the focuses of the studies. Currently, a number of intelligent algorithms have 
been widely discussed, but they still require further verification before being put into practice 
[12, 16]. In this paper, the fault-tolerance design takes into account the problems of N-1 system 
and employs the information fusion of various information zones to remove the adverse effect of 
failed protection components so as to ensure the performance of the protection system. 
Since the principle of pilot protection is applied in the protection criterion, the protection 
criteria will not mal-operate when there is regional information loss or error. To improve the 
protection reliability, the action information of at least two protections criteria is required for fault-
tolerant judgment to avoid protection malfunction, as shown in Equation (6). 
 
221 321 ≥∪≥∪≥ AVAVAV         (6)   
 
 
5.  System Simulation 
To verify the algorithm, electromagnetic transient simulation software PSCAD/EMTDC 
is applied to model 220kV power system in eastern Hubei region for simulation, as shown in 
Figure 4. The grid is made up of three regions, FengHuangShan, EZhou and ShiBanQiao are 
selected as the decision centers of Region 1~3 respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table.1. Fault Detection under Some Wrong 
Information 
 
 
Active 
Value 
Wrong Information 
no Z22 Z31 Z42 Z21 Z32 
Z22 
Z32 
Z28 
Z35 
AV1 2 2 2 2 1 0 2 
AV2 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 
AV3 6 6 6 4 6 6 4 
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Figure 5. Information tree 
Assume that fault occurs to the line LXT from Xialu to Tieshan in Region 3, and 
consider this fault as internal fault. It can be known from Figure 4 that though LXT belongs to 
Region 3, the remote backup information for it is beyond Region 3. It can be known from the 
information tree in Figure 5 that LMCU9 and LMCU13 belong to Region 2, LMCU10 and 
LMCU12 belong to Region 1. Region 3 needs to exchange information of LMCU9, 10, 12, 13 
with Region1 and Region 2 to complete the internal protection of PIZ3. Another way is to convey 
information of Region 3 to Region 1 or Region 2 to complete fault detection of LXT, but in this 
way the information amount in the exchange is larger. Thus, the latter method is not suitable for 
WAPS. 
Information Tree in Figure 5 can well illustrate the protected information zones. With the 
fault decision principle of regional distance protection, distance protection criterion of the line 
LXT can be easily constructed as equation (7~9).  
To illustrate the fault detection algorithm more clearly, in the simulation, the paper set a 
ground fault occurring in the line LXT. The case that information is complete and accurate and 
the other that information is incomplete or erroneous information are considered respectively. 
Under these two conditions, the information redundancy of different information zones is utilized 
to validate the reliability of fault component detection. The result is shown in Table I. 
As shown in Table I, when one or two bits of information is missing or wrong, the 
protection action values adopting fault-tolerant design of protection criterion as shown Equation 
(6) can reliably identify faulty components. 
1) The protection criterion based on PIZ1:      
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3) The protection criterion based on PIZ3:    
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6.  Conclusion 
To resolve the current problems in conventional backup protection, this paper presented 
a relay protection system based on wide-area information. Starting from introducing 
requirements and responsibilities of the relay protection as well as the engineering 
characteristics and special requirement of wide-area network, the paper focused on exploring 
the architecture of limited wide-area protection system and the key technologies to implement it. 
1)  Based on the concept of limit, limited wide-area power grid is proposed. 
2)  Combining the advantages of distributed architecture and centralized architecture, this paper 
proposed a mixed architecture for the protection system. The architecture is based on the 
three-layer structure of LMCU, SDU, and RDU. The decision modes of inter-layer 
communication, independent processing and the back-up model can better ensure the 
reliability of WAPS. 
3)  On the basis of cooperation mechanism of WAPS, a regional distance protection algorithm is 
proposed. With the use of the logic calculation of different information zones, the reliable and 
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quick detection of fault component is achieved. The malfunction of distance protection during 
large-scale flow transfer can be avoided through improving zone 3 protection.  
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